Introduction

Startups often approach cyber security in one of two ways.

Some try to implement enterprise-grade controls before they have a finished product or paying customer. Others postpone security until an investor, enterprise client or security incident forces them to address it.

Neither approach is ideal.

A startup does not need every security control from its first day. It does, however, need the right controls for its current risks, with foundations that will not become expensive obstacles later.

This matters because cyber risk grows alongside the business. More employees create more accounts and devices. More customers create more data and contractual obligations. More investment increases the value of the intellectual property being protected. More complex technology creates more opportunities for errors, vulnerabilities and unauthorised access.

The UK Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026 found that 43% of businesses had identified a cyber breach or attack during the preceding 12 months. This included 42% of microbusinesses, 46% of small businesses and 65% of medium-sized businesses.

The objective is therefore not to make a young company behave like a bank. It is to build security progressively, concentrating first on the risks most likely to disrupt the business, lose customer trust or block future growth.

Funding stage is a guide

The meaning of pre-seed, seed and Series A can vary considerably between companies, sectors and market conditions. The British Business Bank describes pre-seed as the earliest funding stage, often before a minimum viable product exists; seed as the stage where the concept becomes an operating business; and Series A as the point where a company has market traction and is preparing to scale.

These stages provide a useful structure, but funding alone should not determine your security maturity.

A pre-seed health technology company handling medical information may need stronger security than a Series A company operating a low-risk public information platform. A startup selling into banks, government departments or critical infrastructure may encounter demanding security requirements much earlier than a consumer application.

Your security priorities should therefore reflect:

• The sensitivity of your information.
• The harm that could result if your product failed or was compromised.
• The customers and markets you are targeting.
• Your legal and regulatory obligations.
• The value of your intellectual property.
• The level of access your product has to customer systems.
• The complexity of your technology and supply chain.
• The evidence investors, insurers and customers expect.

The following stages should be treated as a practical roadmap rather than a rigid checklist.

Stage 1: Starting the business

Typical position

At this stage, the company may consist of one or two founders developing an idea, registering a domain, creating early business accounts and speaking to potential partners or investors.

There may not yet be a product, employees or formal technology function.

The priority is not certification or lengthy policies. It is to prevent the loss of the basic assets on which the future company depends: its money, identity, accounts, domain names, business information and intellectual property.

Practical priorities

Protect the founders’ key accounts

Start with the accounts that could cause the most damage if compromised:

• Business email.
• Domain registrar.
• Cloud platform.
• Banking and payment services.
• Source-code repository.
• Accounting software.
• Social-media accounts.
• Company registration and tax services.

Use multi-factor authentication wherever it is available. Avoid sharing accounts between founders and do not use a single personal email address as the permanent owner of every business service.

The NCSC’s guidance for small organisations places particular emphasis on securing email and important online accounts, protecting devices, maintaining backups and recognising common attacks.

Use a business password manager

A password manager makes it easier to use unique passwords and share access safely without sending credentials through messages or spreadsheets.

It also helps the company avoid a common future problem: nobody knowing which founder controls an important service or where a password has been stored.

Separate business and personal activity

Create dedicated business email accounts and cloud storage. Avoid keeping the company’s only copy of contracts, code, designs or financial information on a founder’s personal device.

This makes access easier to manage when the team expands and reduces confusion over who owns business information.

Back up what matters

Identify the information the business could not easily recreate, such as:

• Source code.
• Product designs.
• Research.
• Contracts.
• Financial records.
• Customer or prospect information.
• Website content.
• Business plans and investor materials.

Keep recoverable copies and test that important information can actually be restored.

Decide who owns each service

Maintain a simple register listing the company’s important accounts, the owner, the recovery contact and how access would be restored.

This can initially be a small, securely stored spreadsheet. The important step is making ownership explicit.

What not to spend money on yet

Most companies at this stage do not need:

• A full-time security employee.
• An expensive security monitoring platform.
• A large policy library.
• ISO 27001 certification.
• An enterprise governance framework.
• Repeated penetration tests of a product that is still changing daily.

Spend first on secure foundations and sound technology choices.

Stage 2: Pre-seed and building the MVP

Typical position

The founders are beginning to build a minimum viable product. Contractors, developers or early employees may be involved. The startup is selecting cloud services, development tools, payment platforms and other suppliers.

Decisions made now can determine whether security remains manageable or becomes expensive technical debt.

Practical priorities

Establish control of the development environment

The company should know:

• Where its source code is stored.
• Who can access it.
• Who can approve changes.
• How software is built and deployed.
• Where credentials and secrets are stored.
• Which external packages and services the product depends on.

Require individual accounts and multi-factor authentication for code repositories and cloud environments. Remove unused access promptly.

Do not store API keys, cloud credentials, database passwords or signing keys directly in source code. Use an appropriate secrets-management service.

Separate development from production

Avoid building a system where every developer can freely change the live customer environment.

At minimum, separate development and production accounts or environments, restrict production access and record important changes. This becomes much harder to correct after customers and live data are present.

The NCSC’s secure development guidance recommends protecting source repositories, securing development environments and build pipelines, testing security continually and planning for security flaws.

Build security into the product design

Consider security while deciding:

• What data the product will collect.
• How users will authenticate.
• Which users can perform sensitive actions.
• Whether administrative access is separated from normal user access.
• How customer data will be separated.
• How logs and backups will be protected.
• How security updates will be deployed.
• How compromised accounts will be recovered.
• How the service will be shut down or isolated during an incident.

The UK Software Security Code of Practice encourages software vendors to build security into design, development, build environments, deployment, maintenance and customer communication rather than treating security as an additional feature later.

Minimise the personal data you collect

Collecting less information reduces both risk and compliance overhead.

Document what personal information the product uses, why it is required, where it is stored, which suppliers receive it and how long it will be retained.

The ICO states that organisations must apply data protection by design and default, implement security appropriate to the risk and be able to demonstrate the steps they take to comply with UK data protection requirements.

Check critical suppliers before committing

A startup may rely heavily on a small number of services:

• Cloud hosting.
• Source-code repositories.
• Authentication providers.
• Payment processors.
• Customer relationship management platforms.
• Email and collaboration tools.
• Analytics services.
• AI or model providers.

Check the supplier’s security capabilities, data-processing terms, backup arrangements, service availability and options for exporting your information.

The cheapest tool can become expensive if it later prevents you from meeting customer or regulatory requirements.

Create a simple incident contact plan

Document who should be contacted if:

• An account is compromised.
• Credentials are exposed.
• Customer data is lost.
• The product becomes unavailable.
• A supplier reports a breach.
• A suspicious payment or invoice is received.

This does not need to be a large incident-response manual. One page containing names, contact details, decision responsibilities and immediate actions is a useful starting point.

Stage 3: Seed and early customers

Typical position

The company has launched its product, hired its first team members and acquired initial customers.

Security now affects not only the founders but customers, employees and commercial partners. Customer questionnaires and contract requirements may begin to appear.

The priority changes from protecting a small founder-led environment to creating repeatable security practices.

Practical priorities

Give someone clear responsibility

Cyber security may still be part of the CTO, COO or founder’s role, but ownership should be explicit.

That person should be responsible for:

• Tracking important risks.
• Coordinating security improvements.
• Reporting significant issues to leadership.
• Reviewing incidents.
• Confirming that access is removed when people leave.
• Ensuring customer commitments are realistic.

Accountability can be delegated operationally, but it cannot simply be assumed that the cloud provider, IT supplier or development agency is handling everything.

Perform a proportionate security assessment

Review the business across several areas:

• Accounts and identity.
• Employee devices.
• Cloud configuration.
• Product architecture.
• Source code and deployment.
• Customer data.
• Third-party suppliers.
• Backups and recovery.
• Incident readiness.
• Legal and contractual obligations.

Convert the findings into a prioritised roadmap. Concentrate on risks that could materially disrupt the business or prevent sales rather than trying to fix every minor issue immediately.

Formalise joining and leaving processes

Create a repeatable checklist covering:

• Approval of new access.
• Device configuration.
• Multi-factor authentication.
• Security expectations.
• Removal of access on departure.
• Return or remote wiping of company equipment.
• Transfer of business files and responsibilities.

Access should be based on what each person needs rather than giving every early employee administrator privileges.

Manage company devices

Where possible, provide company-managed devices rather than allowing unrestricted use of personal laptops.

Establish requirements for:

• Supported operating systems.
• Security updates.
• Device encryption.
• Screen locking.
• Malware protection.
• Remote management or wiping.
• Separation of business and personal information.

Prepare for customer security reviews

Create a small assurance pack containing:

• A concise description of the security programme.
• Key policies.
• Hosting and data-location information.
• Subprocessor details.
• Backup and incident arrangements.
• Recent security-test results.
• Cyber insurance details, where relevant.
• Named security contacts.

Answer security questionnaires accurately. Do not claim controls, certifications or monitoring that the company does not actually have.

Consider Cyber Essentials

Cyber Essentials is the UK government’s recommended minimum cyber security standard for organisations of all sizes. Its five control areas are firewalls, secure configuration, security update management, user access control and malware protection. Certification can also help demonstrate a baseline to customers, and some organisations require it from suppliers.

For many UK startups, seed stage is a sensible time to assess Cyber Essentials readiness, particularly when selling to larger businesses or the public sector.

Test the product before high-impact use

Security testing should reflect the maturity and risk of the product.

An automated vulnerability scan may be suitable during rapid early development. Independent penetration testing becomes more important before:

• A major product launch.
• Handling sensitive customer information.
• Connecting to customer environments.
• Entering a regulated market.
• Signing a significant enterprise client.
• Making major architectural changes.

A penetration test should validate part of the security programme. It should not be treated as the entire programme.

Stage 4: Series A and repeatable growth

Typical position

The company has established market traction and is hiring rapidly, expanding its customer base and formalising business functions.

Security questions become more detailed. Larger customers may expect evidence of governance, incident exercises, supplier management and secure development.

The priority is to turn separate activities into a coordinated security programme.

Practical priorities

Establish a security strategy and roadmap

Define:

• The security outcomes the company needs.
• The most important business and product risks.
• Required improvements over the next 12 to 24 months.
• Named owners.
• Expected costs.
• Measures of success.
• Dependencies on engineering, IT, legal and operations.

The strategy should support the company’s growth plan. For example, entry into healthcare, financial services or government supply chains may require different controls from those needed for a consumer application.

Introduce formal risk management

Create and maintain a cyber risk register containing:

• The risk scenario.
• The systems, data or business processes affected.
• Existing controls.
• Likelihood and potential impact.
• The responsible owner.
• Planned treatment.
• Target completion date.
• Accepted residual risk.

Leadership should explicitly review and accept significant risks rather than leaving them buried in technical backlogs.

Provide meaningful board oversight

The UK Cyber Governance Code of Practice organises board responsibilities around five principles: risk management, strategy, people, incident planning and recovery, and assurance and oversight. Although primarily designed for medium and large organisations, the NCSC notes that smaller organisations may also use it where their risk profile or supply-chain role justifies it.

A Series A board should receive a regular, concise view of:

• Material risks.
• Significant incidents.
• Progress against the roadmap.
• Overdue security actions.
• Customer and regulatory exposure.
• Security investment decisions.
• Changes in risk created by new markets, products or acquisitions.

Decide what security leadership is required

The company may now need:

• A permanent security manager.
• A fractional or virtual CISO.
• A security-focused engineer.
• External compliance support.
• A managed monitoring or incident-response provider.
• A combination of these roles.

The correct model depends on the amount of daily work, the technical complexity of the product and the level of customer or regulatory scrutiny.

Strengthen identity and access management

Introduce:

• Centralised identity management.
• Single sign-on where practical.
• Multi-factor authentication.
• Role-based access.
• Regular access reviews.
• Controlled administrator accounts.
• Timely removal of access.
• Restrictions on service accounts and machine credentials.

Privileged access to production systems, customer data and critical cloud services should receive additional oversight.

Mature the software development lifecycle

Embed security into engineering through:

• Security requirements for new features.
• Threat modelling for material changes.
• Peer review.
• Automated code and dependency scanning.
• Secrets detection.
• Protected build and deployment pipelines.
• Dependency and vulnerability management.
• Production change controls.
• A vulnerability disclosure process.
• Defined security-update commitments.
• Security training for developers.

The objective is to make security part of delivery rather than a separate approval at the end.

Improve detection and response

Determine which activity needs to be logged and monitored, such as:

• Administrator access.
• Changes to cloud security settings.
• Creation of new privileged accounts.
• Suspicious logins.
• Export of customer data.
• Changes to source-code protections.
• Security alerts from critical suppliers.
• Unusual product or API activity.

A startup does not necessarily need a large internal security operations centre. It does need enough visibility to recognise and investigate incidents that could materially affect the business.

Exercise incident response

Run a tabletop exercise involving leadership, engineering, legal, communications and customer-facing teams.

Test a realistic scenario such as:

• Compromise of a cloud administrator.
• Exposure of customer information.
• Ransomware affecting business operations.
• Theft of source code.
• Failure of a critical supplier.
• A vulnerability actively exploited in the product.

Record lessons and assign actions after the exercise.

Stage 5: Series B, Series C and wider scale

Typical position

The company is expanding into new markets, adding products, acquiring businesses or operating across several jurisdictions.

It may now have hundreds of employees, a large supplier estate and a mixture of legacy and newly developed systems.

At this point, informal security coordination usually stops being sustainable.

Practical priorities

Build a defined security operating model

Establish how security responsibilities are divided between:

• The board.
• Executive leadership.
• The CISO or security leader.
• Technology and engineering.
• Corporate IT.
• Legal and privacy.
• Risk and compliance.
• Product teams.
• Procurement.
• Human resources.
• External security providers.

Document decision rights and escalation routes. Avoid a model in which the security team is considered solely responsible for every risk created elsewhere in the company.

Build the appropriate internal team

Depending on the business, dedicated capabilities may now be needed for:

• Security architecture.
• Cloud and infrastructure security.
• Product and application security.
• Identity and access management.
• Governance, risk and compliance.
• Security monitoring and incident response.
• Security assurance and testing.
• Supplier security.
• Security awareness.

Not every capability needs a separate employee. Some can remain outsourced, but internal ownership should be clear.

Introduce measurable security performance

Measure outcomes rather than the number of tools purchased.

Useful measures may include:

• Critical vulnerabilities beyond their target resolution date.
• Time taken to remove leavers’ access.
• Coverage of multi-factor authentication.
• Privileged accounts reviewed.
• Recovery tests completed successfully.
• Security incidents detected and contained.
• High-risk suppliers assessed.
• Security actions completed on time.
• Products covered by threat modelling and security testing.
• Material risks outside the agreed appetite.

Metrics should help leadership make decisions rather than create the appearance of control.

Strengthen supplier and software supply-chain security

Create a tiered supplier-assurance process. A low-risk marketing platform should not receive the same assessment as a supplier hosting customer data or operating a critical production service.

For important suppliers, consider:

• Data access.
• Administrative access.
• Service resilience.
• Security certifications.
• Incident-notification terms.
• Use of subcontractors.
• Data location.
• Exit and migration options.
• Concentration risk.
• Evidence of secure development.

Prepare for larger incidents

Develop and test:

• Technical incident playbooks.
• Executive crisis management.
• Legal and regulatory assessment.
• Customer communications.
• Media response.
• Business continuity.
• Disaster recovery.
• Alternative supplier arrangements.
• Cyber insurance notification.

The organisation should know who has authority to shut down services, contact customers, engage specialist responders and accept significant operational risk during a crisis.

Use independent assurance

Independent assurance may include:

• Penetration testing.
• Cloud configuration assessments.
• Secure-development reviews.
• Red-team exercises.
• Certification audits.
• Supplier assessments.
• Internal audit.
• Control testing.
• Incident-response exercises.

Assurance should test whether controls work in practice, not simply whether policies exist.

Stage 6: Later-stage growth, acquisition or exit

Typical position

The company may be preparing for a major investment, acquisition, international expansion, public listing or operation as a mature enterprise.

Cyber risk is now directly connected to valuation, operational resilience, regulatory exposure and executive accountability.

Practical priorities

Integrate cyber security into corporate governance

Cyber risk should be managed alongside other material business risks.

Boards should be able to demonstrate:

• Oversight of material cyber risks.
• Approval of an appropriate strategy.
• Adequate investment.
• Clear executive accountability.
• Review of significant incidents.
• Testing of resilience.
• Independent assurance.
• Consideration of cyber risk in major business decisions.

Prepare for transaction due diligence

Investors and acquiring organisations may examine:

• Historical incidents.
• Security governance.
• Product vulnerabilities.
• Data-protection compliance.
• Intellectual-property protection.
• Customer security commitments.
• Supplier dependencies.
• Technical debt.
• Security staffing.
• Certification scope.
• Open remediation actions.

Security issues discovered late in a transaction may affect valuation, warranties, insurance, integration plans or the timetable for completion.

Maintain evidence continuously rather than attempting to reconstruct it during due diligence.

Include security in mergers and acquisitions

Before acquiring or integrating another company, assess:

• Compromised accounts and systems.
• Unsupported technology.
• Exposed credentials.
• Regulatory liabilities.
• Customer commitments.
• Software vulnerabilities.
• Data quality and ownership.
• Supplier contracts.
• Differences in identity and access models.

Avoid connecting a newly acquired environment directly to critical systems before its risks are understood.

Move toward continuous assurance

Instead of relying only on annual assessments, use a combination of automated control monitoring, regular risk review, technical testing, audit and management oversight.

The objective is to understand whether controls continue to operate as technology, people and threats change.

Circumstances that should accelerate the roadmap

Some startups should implement later-stage controls much earlier.

Increase security investment where the business:

• Processes health, financial or other sensitive personal information.
• Provides services to children or vulnerable people.
• Operates payment, identity or authentication services.
• Connects directly to customer production systems.
• Supports government, defence or critical infrastructure.
• Develops strategically important technology.
• Holds valuable research or intellectual property.
• Uses AI to make consequential decisions.
• Controls physical devices, vehicles or industrial systems.
• Operates in several regulated jurisdictions.
• Would cause serious customer harm if unavailable or compromised.

The NPSA’s Secure Innovation guidance is specifically intended to help early-stage technology businesses protect sensitive innovation, intellectual property and future commercial value.

Common mistakes as startups grow

Buying tools before assigning ownership

Security software rarely compensates for unclear responsibility, poor configuration or unresolved risks.

Treating a penetration test as the whole programme

A test provides a view of particular systems at a particular point in time. It does not replace access management, backups, monitoring, secure development or incident preparation.

Collecting policies that nobody follows

A short process used consistently is more valuable than a sophisticated document copied from an enterprise template and ignored.

Pursuing certification without a business reason

Certification can support customer trust and market entry, but it should address a genuine commercial or regulatory requirement. Certification pursued too early can consume time without addressing the startup’s most important risks.

Outsourcing accountability

Managed service providers, cloud platforms and consultants can operate controls and provide expertise. The startup remains responsible for understanding its risks and deciding whether they are being managed adequately.

Making security the security team’s problem

Engineering, IT, HR, procurement and leadership all create and manage cyber risk. A security function should guide, challenge and assure the business.

Waiting for perfect maturity

Security programmes are never finished. The goal is to make defensible, proportionate decisions and improve the controls that matter most as the company changes.

A practical stage-by-stage summary

Final thought

The right time to start cyber security is not when the company reaches a particular funding round. It is when the business begins creating something worth protecting, which is usually much earlier.

The right level of security, however, should change as the company grows.

At the earliest stages, good security means protecting critical accounts, devices, information and code. At seed stage, it means making those practices repeatable. At Series A, it becomes a managed programme. At later stages, it becomes part of corporate governance, operational resilience and enterprise value.

Start small, prioritise the risks that matter and build each new layer before growth makes it urgent. Done well, cyber security should not slow a startup down. It should help the company earn trust, complete due diligence and scale without repeatedly rebuilding its foundations.

Principal sources

• UK Government, Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2025/2026.
• National Cyber Security Centre, Small Organisations Guide to Cyber Security.
• National Cyber Security Centre, Cyber Essentials Overview and Requirements.
• National Cyber Security Centre, Cyber Governance Code of Practice.
• National Cyber Security Centre, Secure Development and Deployment Guidance.
• UK Government and NCSC, Software Security Code of Practice and Implementation Guidance.
• Information Commissioner’s Office, Guide to Accountability and Governance.
• National Protective Security Authority, Secure Innovation Guidance.
• British Business Bank, Guide to Equity Funding Stages.